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I. Introduction 
The following is an update on Kansas legislative activity and case law 
relating to oil, gas and mineral law from August 1, 2016 to July 31, 2017.   
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
There has not been any significant Legislative or Regulatory 
Developments affecting Kansas Oil and Gas Law from August 1, 2016, to 
July 31, 2017. 
III. Judicial Developments 
A. Supreme Court Cases 
No relevant activity was reported during the survey period. 
B. Appellate Activity 
1. Matter of Protest of Barker1 
In Matter of Protest of Barker, the Court of Appeals of Kansas 
addressed, inter alia, as a matter of first impression, whether equipment is 
considered part of an “oil lease” for the purposes of the low production tax 
exemption under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 79-201t.2   
a) Facts and Procedural History 
The Board of Tax Appeals (“BOTA”) found the Barkers’ low production 
oil wells exempt from taxation under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 79-201t. However, 
after the Barkers obtained the tax exemption, the County assessed a tax on 
the equipment the Barkers used to produce oil from those exempted low 
production wells.3 
The Barkers appealed the equipment tax to BOTA, arguing that the 
equipment is exempt from taxation because it is part of an oil lease under 
K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 79-201t(a).4 The County asserted that no authority 
conclusively addressed whether equipment is part of an oil lease for 
purposes of the low production tax exemption.5 BOTA concluded that 
equipment is not included in the term “oil lease” as that term is used in the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 54 Kan. App. 2d 364, 398 P.3d 870 (2017). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 872. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 872-73. 
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exemption for low production leases under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 79-201t(a).6 
The Barkers appealed the BOTA decision to the Court of Appeals (the 
“Court”).   
 
b) Analysis 
No Kansas cases have previously determined whether equipment used in 
the production of oil is considered part of an “oil lease” for purposes of a 
tax exemption, generally, or for the purposes of K.S.A. 79-201t(a)’s 
exemption for low producing oil leases, specifically.7 Therefore, the Court 
turned its focus to interpreting the legislative intent behind the tax 
exemption. 
Tax exemption statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of imposing 
the tax and against allowing an exemption for one who does not clearly 
qualify.8 All doubts against exemption are to be resolved against exemption 
and in favor of taxation.9 
The plain language of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 79-201t(a) reads as follows:  
The following described property, to the extent herein specified, 
shall be and is hereby exempt from all property or ad valorem 
taxes levied under the laws of the state of Kansas: 
(a) All oil leases, other than royalty interests therein, the average 
daily production from which is three barrels or less per 
producing well, or five barrels or less per producing well which 
has a completion depth of 2,000 feet or more.10 
In interpreting the legislative intent of the statute the Court focused on 
three areas of analysis: (1) harmonization of various provisions of the tax 
code; (2) legislative purpose of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 79-201t; (3) the 
legislature not specifically exempting equipment.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. at 873. 
 7. Id. at 875. 
 8. Id. (citing In re Tax Appeal of LaFarge Midwest, 293 Kan. 1039, 1045, 271 P.3d 
732 (2012)). 
 9. Id. (citing Appeal of Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc., 260 Kan. 528, at 532, 920 P.2d 
947 (1996)). 
 10. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201t(a) (West 2016). 
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(1) The Personal Property Statute Distinguishes Between Equipment and 
the Oil Lease Itself 
The Court examined the personal property statute of the tax code, K.S.A. 
79-329, wherein “oil and gas leases and all oil and gas wells . . . together 
with all casing, tubing or other materials therein, and all other equipment” 
used to operate wells are personal property and are to be assessed and taxed 
as such.11 Giving the terms their ordinary meaning, the Court focused on 
two things. First, the Court examined the phrase “together with,” describing 
it to mean “along with, or in addition to.”12 Second, the Court focused on 
the conjunction “and,” pointing out that it serves to connect two separate 
items, here, oil leases and equipment used to operate wells.13 The Court 
found the personal property statute to distinguish between equipment and 
the oil lease itself.14  
(2) Including Equipment Within the Low Production Exemption Does 
Not Serve the Purpose of Statute 
The Court felt the purpose of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 79.201t was to exempt 
from taxation certain low producing oil leases because of low productivity 
and income.15 The Court reasoned that there would be no logical reason for 
the exemption to apply to equipment whose taxation typically does not 
depend on the amount of production.16  
(3) The Legislature Could Have Specifically Exempted Equipment If 
That Was Their Intent 
The Court pointed to specific statutory examples in the tax code where 
the legislature included language to specifically exclude equipment from 
the equation when determining the taxable value of certain royalty interest 
and working interests.17 Based on this prior use of a specific exclusion of 
equipment in another statute, the Court reasoned that if the legislature had 
intended to include equipment within the low production exemption, they 
would have specifically stated so in the statute.18 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Protest of Barker, 398 P.3d at 876 (emphasis in original). 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. at 877. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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(4) Equipment and Oil Leases are Categorized and Assessed Differently 
The Court found the parallel provisions found in the exemption statute 
and the rate statute to be strong evidence that the legislature intended tax 
equipment separately from oil leases.19 The rate statute read as follows: 
(2) Personal property shall be classified into the following 
classes and assessed at the percentage of value prescribed 
therefor: 
(B) mineral leasehold interest, except oil leasehold interests the 
average daily production from which is five barrels or less, and 
natural gas leasehold interests, the average daily production from 
which is 100 mcf or less, which shall be assessed at 25%, at 
30%.20 
Similar language is used in the exemption statute: 
All oil leases, other than royalty interests therein, the average 
daily production from which is three barrels or less per 
producing well, or five barrels or less per producing well which 
has a completion depth of 2,000 feet or more.21 
The Court believed it unlikely that the legislature intended “oil lease” to 
include equipment because equipment and oil leases are categorized and 
assessed differently.22  
c) Conclusion 
Strictly construing the tax exemption, the Court concluded that 
equipment is not considered part of an “oil lease” as that term is used in 
K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 79-201t, and affirmed the decision of BOTA.23 
2. Nickelson v. Bell24 
In Nickelson v. Bell the Court of Appeals of Kansas (the “Court”) 
addressed whether intestate descendants who have not had their interest 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 21. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 878. 
 24. Nickelson v. Bell, 53 Kan. App. 2d 8, 382 P.3d 471 (2016). 
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memorialized by a judicial decree of descent constitute owners under the 
lapsing mineral interests statute of K.S.A. 55-1604.25 
a) Facts and Procedural History 
Ronald and Betty Nickelson (the “Nickelsons”) are the surface owners of 
a certain tract of land situate in Graham County, Kansas. The minerals 
underlying said tract were previously severed and are held by numerous 
other individuals.26  
K.S.A. 55-1602 provides that any interest in mineral rights will lapse and 
revert to the surface owner of the property if it remains unused for 20 
years.27 However, the mineral owner may prevent the lapse by filing a 
claim as set out in K.S.A. 55-1604.28 
The Nickelsons brought a quiet title action as to the unused mineral 
rights on their land.29 Several of the minerals owners filed claims asserting 
their rights under K.S.A. 55-1604.30 The Nickelsons asserted that those 
mineral owners who had acquired their interests through intestate 
succession (the “Intestate Descendants”) were not owners of the mineral 
rights as contemplated by the lapse statute because they had not obtained a 
judicial determination and decree of descent as to their rights.31 
The district court disagreed, holding that “one only need to be a person 
claiming to be an owner of the minerals to file a claim.”32 The Nickelsons 
appealed.33 
b) Analysis 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Intestate Descendants constitute 
owners capable of filing a claim under the Kansas mineral lapse statute.34  
The statute provides that the owner of an unused interest may prevent the 
lapse by filing a claim providing “the name and address of the owner . . . 
and a description of the land on or under which the mineral interest is 
located.”35 If the owner files the claim before the 20 year period expires, “it 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Id. at 473. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 474. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 473. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 474. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1604(a) (West 2017). 
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shall be considered that the mineral interest was being used on the date the 
statement of claim was filed.”36 A claim may be filed up to 60 days after 
receiving either actual or published notice of the potential lapse.37 
In the present case, all procedural timelines put forth in the statute were 
met by the Intestate Descendants. However, the Nickelsons argued that (1) 
the Intestate Descendants are not valid owners as contemplated by the 
statute, but are instead only potential owners because they have not 
obtained a court decree of descent; and (2) because the 60-day time frame 
in K.S.A. 55-1604(b) has expired, any court decree of descent now would 
be untimely.38  
The Court relied heavily on the language of the Kansas Probate Code 
that expressly provides that, absent certain exceptions, “the property of a 
resident decedent, who dies intestate, shall at the time of death pass by 
intestate succession,”39 and “in all cases of intestate succession . . . the 
property shall pass immediately from the decedent to the person entitled to 
receive it.”40 The Court provided that a judicial decree of descent does not 
create title, but “simply memorializes the property transfer that occurred 
immediately after the ancestor owners’ death.”41 
c) Conclusion 
The Court held that the Intestate Descendants constituted owners capable 
of filing a claim under the Kansas mineral lapse statute.42 The decision of 
the district court was affirmed.43 
C. Trial Activity 
No relevant activity was reported during the survey period. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. § 55-1604(b). 
 38. Nickelson, 382 P.3d at 474. 
 39. Id. at 475 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-502 (West 2017)) (emphasis in original). 
 40. Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-509 (West 2017)). 
 41. Id. (citing Jardon v. Price, 163 Kan. 294, 299, 181 P.2d 469 (1947)). 
 42. Id. at 476. 
 43. Id. 
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